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Is knowledge of science associated with 
higher skepticism of pseudoscientific claims? 
By Matthew Johnson & Massimo Pigliucci 
Departments of Botany, of Ecology & Evolutionary Biology, and of Philosophy, 
University of Tennessee, Knoxville 37996-1100 
Phone: 865-974-6221; fax 2258; email pigliucci@utk.edu, matthew@utk.edu 
Introduction 
We live in a world that is increasingly being shaped by and bathed in science. 
The great majority of scientific progress has occurred in the past century, and most of it 
has been concentrated in the past 25 years. Human knowledge now spans from the 
astronomical scale to the quantum one. Yet, several authors have noted that modern 
societies are also characterized by a high degree of belief in a variety of 
pseudoscientific claims that have been thoroughly debunked or otherwise discarded by 
scientists (Anonymous 2001; Ede 2000). 
The argument has been put forth that belief in pseudoscientific claims is the 
result of insufficient science education (references in Goode 2002; Walker et al. 2002). 
However, several polls have shown that at least for some areas of pseudoscience, 
education does not seem to correlate with skepticism (Goode 2002). For example, in 
the United States, the education category with the highest belief in extraterrestrial visits 
aboard UFOs is that of people with a college education (51%), although post-graduate 
education did lead to more skepticism (but still with 39% believers). Indeed, a study by 
Walker et al. (2002) conducted at three undergraduate universities in the U.S. has 
shown no correlation at all between knowledge of science and belief in an array of 
pseudoscientific claims. 
A partial explanation for this state of affairs may be that science factual 
knowledge has little bearing on people's understanding of the evidence in favor or 
against pseudoscientific claims (Walker et al. 2002). It is well known that science 
education, especially (but not exclusively), at the pre-college level is the teaching of 
facts at the detriment of explicit treatment of methodological and conceptual issues 
surrounding the practice of science (Walker et al. 2002). It is not clear why educators 
would expect that massive factual knowledge of science should translate into 
conceptual understanding of the nature of science and into improved critical thinking 
skills, allegedly the true targets of science education. 
This study addresses the issue of the relationships among science factual 
knowledge, conceptual understanding of science, and belief in pseudoscience with a 
3D-question survey consisting of three types of questions given to students enrolled in a 
science major, compared to the responses obtained by groups of non-science majors. 
The first class of questions was made of ten five-choice multiple choice questions 
intended to assess the students' general knowledge of science (e.g., about the periodic 
table or the nature of photons). The second set was constituted of ten true/false 
question that tests a respondent's understanding of important scientific concepts, such 
as the difference between theories and laws. The third class of questions quantified the 
respondents' degree of belief (on a scale of one to five, with five as highest belief) in 
paranormal phenomena, such as telepathy, astrology, or the existence of the Loch Ness 
monster. 
By surveying science and non-science majors, we wished to test the following 
hypotheses of association among our measures of scientific knowledge, understanding, 
and paranormal belief: 
Science majors have more factual knowledge of science than non-science majors 
(since that is what they are primarily taught). 
Science majors have more understanding of conceptual issues in science 
(possibly because they are able to somehow derive it from factual knowledge to 
which they more mostly exposed). 
Science majors express lower degrees of pseudoscientific belief than non-science 
majors (presumably because their knowledge of science makes them more 
skeptical of such claims). 
There are no differences between genders for belief in pseudoscience, knowledge 
of science facts, or understanding of conceptual issues in science (even though 
recent surveys have found a higher degree of pseudoscientific belief in woman 
than men, though the trend is reversed for specific pseudoscientific claims, such 
as UFOs and unusual life forms, such as the Loch Ness monster: Anonymous 
2001). 
We also tested the following expectations concerning the pair wise relationships 
between the different types of questions we administered: 
There is either a positive or no correlation between knowledge of science facts 
and understanding of science concepts (because factual knowledge somehow 
translates into conceptual understanding, or because the two are in fact 
uncorrelated; the only option that is not expected under any educational theory is 
that of a negative correlation between the two). 
There is either a negative or no correlation between knowledge of science facts 
and degree of pseudoscientific belief (because factual knowledge of science does 
in fact indirectly foster critical thinking, or the two {science knowledge and critical 
thinking skills} are unrelated to each other; one would not expect the third 
outcome, that of a positive relationship between conceptual understanding of 
science and pseudoscientific belief). 
There is either a negative or no relationship between understanding of science 
concepts and pseudoscientific belief (because conceptual understanding of 
science increases critical thinking, which leads to reduced belief in 
pseudoscience; alternatively, conceptual understanding of science does not 
translate into critical thinking skills, and hence has no positive relationship 
between science concepts and pseudoscience beliefs, is not expected under any 
scenario). 
Materials and Methods 
We assembled our 30-question survey (Appendix A) by examining two published 
surveys. The first one (Walker, et al. 2002) compared knowledge of scientific facts to 
pseudoscientific beliefs. Nine of the ten science fact multiple-choice questions used by 
those authors were kept, and we wrote one question of our own to replace the one 
removed. The one question was removed because it required specific knowledge of 
genetics, immunology, and reproduction, which we felt went beyond what could 
reasonably be expected at the level of introductory classes. The question we added 
tests a student's knowledge of the properties of a photon. For the pseudoscientific 
questions, we picked ten, out of the original 14, to place in the survey. We reduced the 
number of questions to eliminate overlapping topics (e.g. in the original questionnaire 
there were two questions about ghosts) and to focus on pseudoscientific beliefs that 
appear to be common. We also reduced the range of the belief scale from the original 1-
7 to 1-5, with five indicating the highest level of belief. 
For the scientific concepts portion of our survey, we selected ten true/false 
questions from Richard Carrier's Test of Scientific Literacy 
(http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/richard_carrier/SciLit.htmI2001).Again.asin the 
previous case, we eliminated questions due to overlapping topics. We also eliminated 
questions that seemed highly technical or could be more easily misinterpreted by the 
students. 
We randomized the order in which the 30 questions were presented in our 
survey, so that students would be less likely to try to second-guess the answers 
compared to a scenario in which it was more obvious that a series of pseudoscientific 
questions were presented after a series of fact- or concept-based questions. 
We presented our survey to four classes, two second-year biology and two 
second-year philosophy classes. Our original experimental design assumed that 
philosophy majors would attend the philosophy classes, but due to class scheduling 
conflicts at the time of the survey, the only philosophy classes we had access to were in 
fact ethics classes attended by business majors. Overall, there were 170 respondents. 
Students were asked during class to volunteer to take the survey. The survey 
administrator had no relationship with the class. Instructors were asked not to offer extra 
credit to students taking the survey. Students who responded to the survey were asked 
to provide only four pieces of personal information about themselves: age, gender, 
school year, and major. After instructions were given to the class, the administrator left 
the room for 15 minutes to ensure students did not feel pressured to take the survey. 
Students placed the surveys in a box left at the front of the room for the administrator to 
pick up after 15 minutes. 
After we collected responses from all classes, we entered the results into a 
spreadsheet that was then imported into the statistical software Jump (SAS for 
Macintosh, v.5.01). We first calculated an average coefficient of scientific fact literacy, 
one of scientific concepts literacy, and one of pseudoscientific belief, simply by 
averaging the responses of each student to all questions within each of the three sets. 
We then ran an analysis of variance on each of the three summary indices with major, 
gender, and the major-by-gender interaction as factors. This would provide us with an 
overview of the association between major and gender with science literacy (both 
factual and conceptual) and pseudoscientific belief. Similar results were also obtained 
by running one-way non-parametric Kruskall-Wallis analyses of variance. 
In order to obtain a more in-depth view of the same relationships we also ran a 
series of contingency analyses relating major and gender to the responses to each 
question within each set. We noted both the overall statistical significance of major and 
gender effects for each question, and the percentage of correct responses (in the case 
of science fact or concept questions) or the degree of pseudoscientific belief relative to 
the total. 
We then considered the possible relationships among the three sets of 
measures, which were the major goal of this study. In order to quantify them, we 
calculated both non-parametric correlation coefficients (Spearman's and Kendall's) as 
well as parametric Pearson correlation coefficients between the each pair of overall 
indices of science factual knowledge, science conceptual understanding, and 
pseudoscientific belief. Results were very similar regardless of the specific correlation 
coefficient used. 
Finally, we wished to quantify and visualize the similarities in students' responses 
to all thirty questions, which we accomplished by calculating an index of pairwise 
similarity between responses and subjecting the resulting matrix to a clustering 
algorithm, which produced a dendrogram (tree-like structure). Results were very similar 
when we used different indices of similarity (Gower's general Similarity coefficient, 
Jaccard's coefficient, and the simple matching coefficient) suitable for categorical data 
such as ours (Sneath and Soka11973, pp. 129-137). Tree topology was also stable to 
the use of different clustering algorithms, such as unweighted arithmetic average 
(UPGMA), weighted arithmetic average (WPGMA), unweighted centroid (UPGMC), 
weighted centroid (WPGMC), and Ward's method (Sneath and Sokal 1973, pp. 214-
244). All calculations of similarity indices and cluster analyses were conducted using the 
"R package" by Casgrain and Legendre, version 4.0, available at 
http://www.fas.umontreal.calbiol/casgrain/en/labo/permute. On the resulting 
dendrogram, questions that tended to elicit similar responses across all classes of 
students were grouped together. 
Results 
Parametric analyses of variance of the relationship between Major, Gender, and 
Major-by-Gender interaction and the overall students' scores in science facts, science 
methods, and pseudoscientific belief (Table 1), found only a significant association 
between majors and their overall science fact score. The graph to the right of the table 
illustrates that science majors scored (predictably) better than non-science majors did 
on factual questions regarding a broad range of scientific fields, although the difference 
between the two groups was certainly not overwhelming. Similar results were also 
obtained using a series of non-parametric one-way ANOVAs (Kruskall-Wallis) on Major 
and Gender (details not shown). 
The general results reported in Table 1 are consistent with the question-by-
question analyses detailed in Tables 2-4 and based on a series of contingency tests. 
For example, note that while there are scattered Significant effects of gender on science 
factual knowledge (Table 2), major on conceptual understanding of science (Table 3), 
and of gender on pseudoscientific belief (Table 4), the majority of individual significant 
effects were found for major on science factual knowledge. Interestingly, questions 
concerning factual knowledge of the physics of energy, the nature of photons, the 
difference between organic and inorganic matter, the metric system, the litmus test, and 
the relationship between earth-sun distance and the seasons all received low scores, 
with less than 50% of even the science majors getting them correct (boldface in Table 
2). 
Perhaps even more discouraging was the fact that no science method question 
received even 50% of correct answers, regardless of major or gender. Indeed, the 
difference between theory and laws was understood by less than 5% of the respondents 
in any category! 
Perhaps a little more encouraging was the fact that the modal degree of belief in 
pseudoscientific claims was never higher than 3 (out of 5), and it was often lower than 
that (most frequently 1, the most skeptical response) (Table 4). Nevertheless, a low 
degree of skepticism was found for claims concerning the healing power of magnets, 
the presence of aliens in Area 51, and the existence of telepathy or clairvoyance 
(boldface in Table 4). On the positive side, students seemed to be particularly skeptical 
of the good or bad luck brought by chain letters and broken mirrors. 
In order to determine the degree of correlation between the pairwise overall 
scores of students in pseudoscience, science facts, and science concepts, we 
calculated series of Spearman rank correlation coefficients (Table 5). They indicated 
that there was a weak positive correlation between knowledge of science facts and 
understanding of science concepts. We also found a weak negative correlation between 
pseudoscientific beliefs and science facts but apparently no relationship between 
pseudoscience belief and understanding of scientific concepts and methods. None of 
these correlation coefficients exceeded 0.27, however, indicating a large amount of 
unexplained variation in each indicator. Similar results were obtained using either 
Kendall's rank or Pearson parametric correlation coefficients. 
Finally, a cluster analysis on the responses to all questions was performed using 
several measures of similarity and methods of hierarchical clustering (see Materials and 
Methods). The results reported here (Figure 1) were obtained by subjecting a matrix of 
Gower's general Similarity coefficients to unweighted arithmetic average (UPGMA) 
clustering (though similar results were obtained with the other methods). Three 
measures of cophenetic correlation (Sneath and Sokal 1973, pp. 278-280) between the 
output of the clustering algorithm and the original similarity matrix were satisfactory, 
indicating that the dendrogram reliably reproduced the degree of similarity among 
responses to the various questions (the cophenetic coefficients were as follows: Kendall 
= +0.77; Pearson = +0.82; Gower = 2.98; notice that the first two vary between 0 and 1, 
where higher values indicate better fit, while the third one varies between 0 and infinity, 
and low values indicate better fit). The results show two major clusters, with several 
distinct sub-clusters. Most of the pseudoscience questions clustered together (bottom of 
diagram in Fig. 1), with the exception of those concerning luck brought by chain letters 
and broken mirrors (the same two for which students showed a high degree of 
skepticism), which clustered with a large number of mostly science fact questions (top 
portion of Fig. 1). The second major cluster was made of several sub-clusters, mostly 
with a mixture of science factual and conceptual questions, some of which are perhaps 
suggestive of interesting associations. For example, one tight cluster grouped together 
answers related to the ideas that scientific conclusions are tentative, that science is 
based on assumptions and postulates, and that theoretical entities are often featured in 
scientific conclusions. Other clusters, however, do not seem to hint at any simple 
relationship within or between the science facts and methods questions. 
Discussion 
Belief in all sorts of paranormal claims is very high in the United States, with 
recent surveys (Anonymous 2001) indicating, for example, that 36% of Americans think 
astrology is "very" or "sort of" SCientific, 17% report having contacted a fortune teller, 
and a whopping 1/3 to half of Americans believing in UFOs. The causes of such 
widespread belief in irrational or unsubstantiated claims are difficult to pinpoint, as are 
potential trends (increasing or decreasing), due to the complexity of cultural forces 
involved and the lack of standardization across surveys. 
Walker et al. (2002) have put forth the suggestion that science education is no 
guarantee of skepticism, and our general results seem to support the conclusions based 
on their own study. Walker et al. found no significant correlation between scores on a 
test of science literacy and degree of belief in an array of pseudoscientific claims when 
they surveyed three samples of undergraduate students at small universities in the 
United States. 
Interestingly, work by Vitulli et al. (1999) found that belief in the paranormal is 
stronger in young males attending college as well as in elderly women, although they 
did find a possible positive effect of education: elderly people attending continuing 
education courses scores significantly lower in their belief in the paranormal (though, of 
course, this may have been due to a self-selecting effect). 
The scope of our study was such that we could test some specific hypotheses 
concerning the expected association between indicators of science knowledge (both 
factual and conceptual) and of pseudoscientific belief. Of course, we were in no position 
to directly address the causal links between education and belief, although below we 
suggest some follow-up studies that might get closer to that goal. First, we hypothesized 
that science majors should display more knowledge of science facts than non-science 
majors, a minimalistic prediction if in fact science education has to have any effect 
whatsoever. Indeed, our results did confirm this expectation, although the difference 
between the scores of the two groups was not nearly as impressive as one might have 
hoped. 
We also made the somewhat more risky prediction that science majors would 
display more conceptual understanding of science, allegedly the true goal of science 
education, than their non-science counterparts would. No such difference was found, 
which leads to at least questioning one of the most cherished assumptions of science 
educators: if we wish our students to understand how science works, confronting them 
with a lot of factual knowledge does not seem to help. Moreover, the general degree of 
conceptual understanding of science on the part of our students was abysmally low, 
especially in crucial areas such as the distinction between laws of nature (Le., 
observations of regular patterns with no exceptions) and well-substantiated scientific 
theories (Le., human interpretations of how the world works, which withstood repeated 
empirical tests). 
The third prediction was even bolder: we speculated that science majors would 
display lower degrees of pseudoscientific belief, at least in part as a result of their 
science training (though, of course, effects due to self-selection are also possible). 
Again, we were disappointed: while students in our samples did show generally low 
degrees of pseudoscientific belief (with the notable exceptions of the healing powers of 
magnets, the existence of aliens being held at the government facility known as "Area 
51," and the existence of telepathy or clairvoyance), no difference was found between 
the majors. 
We also investigated the possibility of existence of differences in our indicators 
between genders, given the repeated observation of such differences in previous 
surveys. For example, belief in all (though not all) paranormal phenomena was found to 
be higher in women than men by a survey conducted by the National Science 
Foundation (Anonymous 2001), and a survey by Irwin (1985) found that belief in the 
paranormal is stronger in women than men. Our overall results did not show any such 
difference when an average indicator of pseudoscientific belief was considered, nor 
were gender differences significant for overall science factual or conceptual knowledge. 
However, more detailed analyses did reveal a hint of some differences between 
genders. For example, female students knew slightly better than their male counterparts 
about the dominant source of energy on earth and about the nature of infectious 
disease, though it is difficult to speculate on the causes of this difference, and we are 
inclined to attribute them to statistical fluctuations. Significantly, we found no differences 
between genders even upon a more in-depth analysis in the area of conceptual 
understanding of science, while men were less likely to believe in the existence of the 
Loch Ness monster and more likely to think that animals can sense ghosts. Again, 
however, it is possible that the latter two findings were due to statistical fluctuations and 
carry no general meaning. 
One of the major goals of our research was to investigate the possible 
relationships between our three indices of knowledge of science fact and 
pseudoscientific belief. Under the most optimistic scenario, we had predicted a positive 
association between knowledge of science facts and understanding of science concepts 
(if the standard educational assumption holds), and a negative association between 
either measure of science literacy and pseudoscientific belief (under the assumption 
that more knowledge of science makes for better critical thinking, and therefore more 
skepticism about pseudoscience). 
The first prediction turned out to be correct, although the strength of the 
association between knowledge of science facts and understanding of concepts was 
very weak. This is consistent with the idea that there is some detectable seepage from 
learning many facts about science to a higher-level understanding of how science 
works. However, the weakness of the relationship strongly suggests that there must be 
better ways of achieving this, consistently with recent literature on science teaching and 
critical thinking (Wandersee 1990; Sundberg et al. 1994; Belzer et al. 2003). 
On the other hand, neither knowledge of science facts nor understanding of 
scientific concepts seemed to be associated with the degree of belief in pseudoscience 
(though both correlation coefficients were in the right direction, that is, negative). This, 
of course, is subject to several interpretations, and does not necessarily mean that a 
better understanding of science does not foster critical thinking. However, it does mean 
that whatever association there may be between knowledge of science and skepticism 
about pseudoscience, it is not very strong or particularly evident. Indeed, even at the 
much more sophisticated level of graduate studies, Lehman et al. (1988) found that 
training in the hard sciences (chemistry) did not result in a high level of transferability of 
critical thinking skills to everyday problems. On the other hand, graduate students in the 
social sciences (psychology), who are continuously exposed to complex problems 
characterized by probabilistic answers, seem to be much better equipped to apply their 
critical thinking skills to other domains than academic research. This is particularly 
interesting in this context because it argues that another assumption commonly made 
by science educators, that science training makes for better critical thinkers, may not be 
true even at the level of graduate studies, let alone undergraduate. 
Several caveats and possible future directions in regards to this study need to be 
briefly discussed. One obvious limitation of our research is that it did not include a 
longitudinal component to help discriminate between the actual effect of teaching 
science and the possibility of self-selection of more critically thinking students into 
scientific disciplines. However, since we did not find significant differences in this 
respect between science and non-science majors, our results can hardly be attribute to 
self-selection processes. Nevertheless, it would be interesting to compare, for example, 
freshman and seniors in science vs. non-science majors, with the idea that any 
difference between groups that increases with time would be likely due to training rather 
than self-selection. It is of course possible that both effects contribute, which would 
translate into a significant year-by-major interaction in an analysis of variance. 
Secondly, it would be interesting to examine the possible differences between 
actual philosophy students and science majors, as opposed to business students taking 
ethics classes in philosophy, as it happened in our case. The reason for this is that 
philosophers are among the few majors who actually get formal training in critical 
thinking, both through courses explicitly designed for that purpose, as well as through 
rigorous training in logical and conceptual analyses of any course material to which they 
are exposed. 
Thirdly, it would be interesting to expand the study to include graduate students, 
comparing them between disciplines (a la Lehman et aI1988), as well as with beginning 
and advanced undergraduates. One would expect that graduate students might be 
more skeptical than undergraduates of pseudoscientific claims regardless of their 
discipline because of more maturity and education. However, we also predict 
differences in critical thinking abilities between philosophy and science graduate 
students (to the advantage of the former) and among different kinds of graduate 
students (to the advantage of people working on complex problems characterized by 
probabilistic approaches, such as psychology and organismal biology). 
Overall, much more needs to be understood about the relationship among factual 
knowledge of science, its conceptual understanding, critical thinking, and belief in 
pseudoscience (which, incidentally, does not itself represent a homogeneous category, 
with surveys showing distinctions between different kinds of pseudoscientific belief: 
Anonymous 2001; Goode 2002). Certainly, we cannot simply assume that all we need 
to do in order to improve critical thinking and reasonable skepticism is to teach more 
science facts. 
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Table 1. Analyses of variance of the relationship between Major, Gender and Major-by-Gender 
interaction and the overall students' scores in science facts, science methods and pseudoscience belief. 
RA2 indicates the amount of variance explained by the model, numbers in parenthesis on the top row 
indicate degrees of freedom of each effect. In the main body of the table, means squares values are 
reported, together with their associated level of statistical significance (in parentheses). The graph 
illustrates the mean differences between groups in the only case in which significant differences were 
detected. Notice that similar results were obtained by running non-parametric one-way ANOVAs 
(Kruskal-Wallis) on Major and Gender. 
RI\2 Major Gender (1) (1) 
24.7% 0.8419 0.0019 
Major x 
Gender 
(1) 
0.0326 
error 
(142) 
0.0199 
1. 
o Overall science fact 
score (0.0001) (0.7570) (0.2026) 
t5 CD 
«10) 
..... "0 
CD CD u-
a5 ~ ~ 
Overall science 
methods score 
Overall 
pseudoscience 
belief 
1.4% 
1.0% 
0.0315 
(0.3090) 
0.1840 
(0.4713) 
0.0146 
(0.4878) 
0.4450 
(0.2631 ) 
0.0001 0.0302 
(0.9474) 
0.0011 0.3526 
(0.9552) 
.- c 
u.::£ en 
o. 
o non-
science 
majors 
..,. 
science 
majors 
Table 2. Contingency analyses of the responses to questions on science facts, by Major (non-science 
vs. science) and Gender. Questions highlighted in boldface were characterized by a particularly poor 
response (Le., no category reached 50% of correct answers). Percentages refer to total correct answers 
(to provide determine how many people responded correctly or incorrectly overall), which means that 
they do not add up to 100% within factors. Boldfaced p-values highlight particularly striking differences 
between Majors or Genders (Le., p<0.01). 
Major Gender 
Question non- science likelihood p-value female male likelihood p-value 
science ratio ratio 
Dominant source of energy 34.8% 52.8% 11.919 0.0006 45.5% 41.3% 7.105 o.oon 
on earth 
Physics of energy 34.6% 49.4% 5.177 0.0229 41.9% 42.5% 0.475 0.4906 
Nature of photons 14.8% 14.2% 0.961 0.3270 13.7% 14.9% 0.002 0.9611 
Nature of infectious disease 27.2% 51.9% 26.154 0.0001 42.9% 35.7% 8.363 0.0038 
Organic vs. inorganic 22.1% 43.6% 15.775 0.0001 34.9% 31.4% 2.310 0.1286 
Periodic table 35.2% 54.3% 21.057 0.0001 43.5% 45.8% 0.011 0.9149 
Metric system 29.0% 38.9% 0.753 0.3856 32.1% 36.9% 0.765 0.3818 
Litmus test 20.6% 46.3% 24.411 0.0001 34.3% 31.9% 0.765 0.3816 
Genetic disorders 40.5% 54.0% 4.319 0.0377 47.0% 47.0% 1.550 0.2131 
Earth-Sun distance and 8.6% 9.3% 0.147 0.7014 6.6% 12.5% 3.348 0.0673 seasons 
Table 3. Contingency analyses of the responses to questions on science concepts, by Major 
(non-science vs. science) and Gender. Questions highlighted in boldface were characterized by a 
particularly poor response (Le., no category reached 50% of correct answers). Percentages refer to total 
correct answers (to provide determine how many people responded correctly or incorrectly overall), which 
means that they do not add up to 100% within factors. Boldfaced p-values highlight particularly striking 
differences between Majors or Genders (Le., p<0.01). Notice that all questions received very low overall 
percentages of correct answers, and that there were few significant differences between levels of the 
factors. 
Major Gender 
non-
science likelihood p-value female male likelihood p-value Question 
science ratio ratio 
Science produces tentative 27.6% 39.9% 2.050 0.1522 32.5% 33.1% 0.137 0.7111 
conclusions 
Is there only one scientific method? 26.1% 36.0% 0.789 0.3744 34.7% 28.1% 4.289 0.0384 
Theories are explanations, not facts 36.4% 44.4% 0.001 0.9901 36.9% 43.5% 2.298 0.1295 
Is science just about facts or about 35.0% 47.9% 2.077 0.1495 42.0% 40.8% 1.587 0.2077 interpretations? 
Does science require to conduct 19.8% 27.2% 0.506 0.4769 21.4% 25.6% 0.627 0.4285 
experiments? 
Can experiments prove theories? 11.8% 26.1% 8.131 0.0044 19.8% 18.0% 0.435 0.5094 
Science includes beliefs, 25.9% 27.8% 0.785 0.3755 26.2% 27.4% 0.035 0.8509 
assumptions & non-observables 
Are laws exceedingly well confirmed 3.1% 5.0% 0.273 0.6013 4.8% 3.0% 1.055 0.3044 theories? 
A theory is a hypothesis that has 38.9% 49.4% 0.074 0.7852 43.5% 44.6% 0.132 0.7162 been amply confirmed 
Science uses theoretical entities 30.3% 34.6% 0.311 0.5769 31.7% 33.5% 0.029 0.8655 that have never been observed 
- ----
Table 4. Contingency analyses of the responses to questions on pseudoscientific beliefs, by Major 
(non-science vs. science) and Gender. Questions highlighted in boldface were characterized by a 
particularly low skeptical response (Le., not even 50% of students in any category expressed complete 
disbelief). Entries under the levels of each factor indicate the modal response (from 1 to 5, with 5 as the 
highest degree of belief), and the percentage of students (within each level of each factor) answering in 
that fashion (in parentheses). Boldfaced p-values highlight particularly strikingly (Le., p<0.01) differences 
between Majors or Genders. Notice that there were few significant differences between levels of the 
factors. 
Major Gender 
non- likelihood likelihood Question 
science science ratio p-value female male ratio p-value 
Magnets can heal 3 3 3.587 0.4648 3 3 2.950 0.5661 (39.7%) (42.2%) (42.7%) (39.1%) 
There are aliens in area 51 2-3 3 0.999 0.9100 3 2 0.636 0.9589 (30.1%) (30.0%) (29.3%) (29.9%) 
Telepathy or clairvoyance 2 2 4.237 0.3748 2 1 6.862 0.1434 
are real (38.4%) (32.2%) (35.4%) (40.2%) 
Astrology predicts personality & future 1 1 2.311 0.6787 1 1 10.441 0.0336 (52.1%) (48.9%) (40.2%) (60.9%) 
Bigfoot exists 1 1 9.385 0.0522 1 1 4.081 0.3952 (58.9%) (50.0%) (56.1%) (50.6%) 
The Loch Ness monster exists 1 1 7.339 0.1190 1 1 18.508 0.0010 (52.1%) (41.1%) (47.6%) (44.8%) 
Sending chain letters brings good luck 1 1 8.264 0.0409 1 1 3.785 0.2856 (80.8%) (87.8%) (81.7%) (88.5%) 
Animals can sense ghosts 1 1 1.256 0.8688 1 1 15.191 0.0043 (48%) (40.%) (31.7%) (53.5%) 
Voodoo kils 1 1 0.972 0.9141 1 1 3.796 0.4343 (58.3%) (55.6%) (51.2%) (61.6%) 
Broken mirrors bring bad luck 1 1 3.641 0.3029 1 1 7.977 0.0465 (72.6%) (82.2%) (72.0%) (85.1%) 
- ---
least 
skeptica 
I 
males 
females 
Table 5. Pairwise Spearman's rank correlation coefficients 
relating overall scores of students in pseudoscience, science 
facts and science concepts categories. Significance levels of 
the statistical tests are in parentheses. Similar results were 
obtained using either Kendall's rank or Pearson parametric 
correlation coefficients. 
Pseudoscience Science facts 
Science facts -0.18 
(0.0228) 
Science -0.06 +0.27 
concepts (0.4383) (0.0007) 
Earth's energy < 
<-
Energy physics < I 
Peri odi c tabl e < 1< 
1<-
Genetic disorders < - I 
Hypothesis vs. theory < 
Theories as explanations < <~ 1<-
1<-
Infectious diseases < 
1< 
Not just facts < 
chai n 1 etters < 1<-
1< 
Broken mirrors < 
< 
organic vs. inorganic < 1 
< 
Metri c system < 
1<-
Litmus test < I 
< 
One scientific method < 
< 
Tentative conclusions < I 
1<-
Theoretical entities < 
1<-
science makes assumptions < 
<--------------------------------
<-------------------Nature of photons 
Laws vs. theories < 1<-
1<--
Earth-sun & seasons <---------
1<--
Experiments prove theories < 1< ___ _ 
Experiments required < 
Magnets can heal < 
Aliens in Area 51 < 
Telepathy/clairvoyance < 
Astrology < 
1<-
voodoo < 
Bigfoot < 
1<----------------
Loch Ness < 
1< 
Animals sense ghosts < 
<---------------
1<--
<----
<----
< 
Level 
0.07649 
0.08855 
0.05768 
0.06474 
0.04321 
0.11243 
0.07445 
0.08224 
0.12402 
0.05542 
0.12884 
0.12192 
0.14542 
0.14981 
0.21221 
0.12086 
0.13707 
0.39355 
0.11552 
0.12720 
0.08163 
0.15780 
0.30824 
0.23521 
0.26717 
0.20000 
0.21454 
0.09517 
0.21285 
Figure 1. Cluster analysis of 
the similarities in students' 
responses to the thirty 
questions on science facts, 
science concepts and 
pseudoscience. Numbers on 
the right quantify similarities 
between objects within each 
cluster. The dendrogram is 
based on unweighted 
arithmetic average (UPGMA) 
of a matrix of similarities 
calculated using Gower's 
general similarity coefficient. 
Measures of cophenetic 
relationships between the 
derived and original matrix 
(Kendall's tau = 0.77, 
Pearson's r = 0.82, and 
Gower's distance = 2.98), 
indicated a good fit between 
the dendrogram and the 
similarity matrix. The same 
topology was obtained by 
subjecting the same 
coefficients to other clustering 
methods, and the major 
features of the topology were 
retained when using different 
coefficients of similarity, such 
as Jaccard's and the simple 
matching coefficient. These 
other methods, however, 
yielded a lower fit between 
tree topology and similarity 
matrix when measured by the 
above-mentioned cophenetic 
coefficients, and did not 
resolve the differences among 
the responses to the questions 
on pseudoscientific beliefs. 
Appendix A 
Survey Responses 
Major: 
Year: 
Age: 
Gender: 
Survey 
Please circle what, in your opinion, is the best answer. 
1. Which of the following is the dominant source of all or nearly all of the Earth's energy? 
(A) Plants, (8) Animals, (C) Coal, (0) Oil, (E) The Sun 
2. Which of the following is true? 
(A) Energy may be converted from one form to another 
(8) Energy may not be converted from one form to another 
(C) The energy that a moving object possesses because of its motion is correctly 
known as potential energy 
(0) Objects which possess energy because of their position are said to have kinetic 
energy 
(E) Most scientists readily agree that energy from nuclear fission will be the chief source 
of energy by the year 2005 
3. The body can be healed by placing magnets onto the skin near injured areas. 
1 =1 do not believe in this at all 
2=1 doubt that this is real 
3=1 am unsure if this is real or not 
4=1 believe this is real 
5=1 strongly believe this is real 
4. Science only produces tentative conclusions that can change. T / F 
5. Science has one uniform way of conducting research called ''the scientific method." T / F 
6. A photon is? 
(A) A particle 
(8) A wave 
(C) A unit of energy 
(0) A particle and a wave, depending on the circumstances 
(E) A theoretical entity used to explain light 
7. The government is hiding evidence of alien visitors at places such as Area 51. 
1 =1 do not believe in this at all 
2=1 doubt that this is real 
3=1 am unsure if this is real or not 
4=1 believe this is real 
5=1 strongly believe this is real 
8. Scientific theories are explanations and not facts. T / F 
9. A person can use their mind to see the future or read other people's thoughts. 
1 =1 do not believe in this at all 
2=1 doubt that this is real 
3=1 am unsure if this is real or not 
4=1 believe this is real 
5=1 strongly believe this is real 
10. A person's astrological sign can predict a person's personality and their future. 
1 =1 do not believe in this at all 
2=1 doubt that this is real 
3=1 am unsure if this is real or not 
4=1 believe this is real 
5=1 strongly believe this is real 
11. Heavy infections of Trichinella in people may cause a disease called trichinosis; such a 
situation may best be described as which of the following? 
(A) Parasitism 
(B) Mutualism 
(C) Commercialism 
(D) Benevolent 
(E) Benign 
12. Which of the following is the main difference between an organic and an inorganic 
compound? 
(A) The former is a living compound, while the latter is a nonliving compound 
(B) There are many more of the latter than of the former 
(C) The latter can be synthesized only by living organisms 
(D) The latter can be synthesized only by nonliving organisms 
(E) The former are those that contain carbon. 
13. On the periodic table the symbol Pb represents which of the following? 
(A) Iron, (B) Phosphorus, (C) Lead, (D) Plutonium, (E) Potassium. 
14. An ape-like mammal, sometimes called Bigfoot, roams the forests of America. 
1 =1 do not believe in this at all 
2=1 doubt that this is real 
3=1 am unsure if this is real or not 
4=1 believe this is real 
5=1 strongly believe this is real 
15. Science is just about the facts, not human interpretations of them. T I F 
16. To be scientific one must conduct experiments. T I F 
17. A dinosaur, sometimes called the Loch Ness Monster, lives in a Scottish Lake. 
1 =1 do not believe in this at all 
2=1 doubt that this is real 
3=1 am unsure if this is real or not 
4=1 believe this is real 
5=1 strongly believe this is real 
18. Sending chain letters can bring you good luck. 
1 =1 do not believe in this at all 
2=1 doubt that this is real 
3=1 am unsure if this is real or not 
4=1 believe this is real 
5=1 strongly believe this is real 
19. An experiment can prove a theory true. T I F 
20. Which of the metric terms is closest to the measurement of a new piece of chalk? 
(A) Meter, (B) Liter, (C) Kilogram, (D) Decimeter, (E) Kilometer. 
21. A litmus test conducted on HCI would have which of the following results? 
(A) There is no effect on the color of the litmus paper 
(8) The litmus paper disintegrates 
(C) The litmus paper turns blue 
(0) The litmus paper turns red 
(E) The carbonation causes oxygen 
22. Science is partly based on beliefs, assumptions, and the nonobservable. T / F 
23. Animals, such as cats and dogs, are sensitive to the presence of ghosts. 
1 =1 do not believe in this at all 
2=1 doubt that this is real 
3=1 am unsure if this is real or not 
4=1 believe this is real 
5=1 strongly believe this is real 
24. Which of the following is a genetic disorder? 
(A) Down's Syndrome, (8) Syphilis, (C) Malaria, (D) Leukemia, (E) Emphysema. 
25. A scientific law is a theory that has been extensively and thoroughly confirmed. T / F 
26. An accepted scientific theory is an hypothesis that has been confirmed by considerable 
evidence and has endured all attempts to disprove it. T / F 
27. Voodoo curses are real and have been known to kill people. 
1 =1 do not believe in this at all 
2=1 doubt that this is real 
3=1 am unsure if this is real or not 
4=1 believe this is real 
5=1 strongly believe this is real 
28. Scientists accept the existence of theoretical entities that have never been directly observed. 
T/F 
29. A broken mirror can bring you bad luck for many years. 
1 =1 do not believe in this at all 
2=1 doubt that this is real 
3=1 am unsure if this is real or not 
4=1 believe this is real 
5=1 strongly believe this is real 
30. When is the Earth closest to the Sun? (Assume seasons in the Northern hemisphere) 
(A) During the summer, (8) During the fall, (C) During the winter 
(D) During the spring, (E) During the spring and summer. 
Answers 
I.E 
2.A 
4. T 
5.F 
6.E 
8. T 
11. A 
12. E 
13.C 
15. F 
16.F 
19.F 
20.D 
21. D 
22. T 
24. A 
25.F 
26.T 
28. T 
30. C 
